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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this appeal is properly reposed in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a~3(2)(j), the appeal having been transferred from the Utah Supreme 
Court on April 13, 1999. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. Was the Trial Court's award of attorney's fees to Pugh appropriate? 
A. Was North American's contract with Pugh a contract of insurance which 
would support an award of attorney's fees as consequential damages? 
1. Standard of Review. This issue raises a challenge to a Conclusion of Law 
entered by the Trial Court and is therefore reviewed under a "correctness" 
standard. State v. Pena 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). 
2. Preservation of Issue. There is no indication in the record that this 
issue was preserved on appeal. 
B. Was breach of the implied covenant of good faith performance sufficiently 
pleaded, tried by consent or supported by findings of fact? 
1. Standard of Review, Questions of law are reviewed for "correctness" without deference to 
the Trial Court's decision. State v. Pena, supra. 
2. Preservation of Issue. There is no indication in the record that this issue was preserved on 
appeal. 
C. Was North American's obligation on Pugh's transmission claim "fairly 
debatable"? 
1. Standard of Review. Conclusion of law are generally reviewed for 
correctness. However, some deference will be granted to the trial 
court's conclusion. Billings v. Union Banker's Ins. Co. 918 P.2d 461, 
464 (Utah 1996). 
2. Preservation of Issue. The record contains no indication that North 
American raised the "fairly debatable" defense at the trial level or 
otherwise preserved it on appeal. 
II. Was the Trial Court's award of damages to Pugh for the loss of use of his vehicle 
appropriate? 
A. Did Pugh take reasonable efforts to mitigate his damages? 
1. Standard of Review. Questionof law reviewed for correctness. State 
v. Pena, supra. 
2. Preservation of Issue. Although the Trial Court did issue a 
Conclusion of Law concerning mitigation of damages, there is no 
evidence in the record that North American objected to that conclusion 
or otherwise preserved it on appeal. 
B. Did Pugh submit sufficient evidence at trial or are the Trial Court's 
Findings of Fact sufficiently supported by the evidence? 
1. Standard of Review. Sufficiency of evidence or findings of fact are 
reviewed on a clearly erroneous standard. Alta Industries Limited v. 
Hurst 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993). 
2. Preservation on Appeal. The record contains no indication that this 
issue was preserved on appeal. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
The following statutes are determinative of issues or portion thereof addressed in the 
respective briefs of the parties. The text of the statutes is presented in its entirety in the 
Appendix. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(40) 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(44) 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(56) 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-6a-l et seq. 
Rule 15(b) Utah Rules of Civ. P. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature, Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
The case before the court is, by nature, a contract dispute between David Pugh, 
Plaintiff Appellee (hereinafter "Pugh") and North American Warranty Services, Inc., 
Defendant/Appellant (hereinafter "North American"). The disputes surround a claim 
which Pugh made on a Vehicle Service Contract which he had purchased from North 
American for repair or replacement of the transmission in his car. Following a brief 
examination of the vehicle, North American declined to repair or replace the 
transmission. Pugh filed this action with the Third District Court approximately 60 days 
after his claim had been denied, alleging that North American had breached its 
obligations under the contract to evaluate and pay the claim. Six months after the claim 
was submitted, the transmission was torn down and North American acknowledged that it 
needed to be repaired. Finally, North American authorized and paid for repair of the 
transmission approximately 12 months after receiving the claim. 
The case was tried, without a jury, to the Honorable Robert K. Hilder of the Third 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The evidence submitted to the 
Trial Court consisted of a Statement of Stipulated Facts including Exhibits A through J 
(included as Addendum 3 to Appellant's Brief), the Affidavit of Kenneth Riddle, which 
was submitted pursuant to stipulation of the parties (R-86A, 86B, 86C), and the live 
testimony of Pugh. Counsel for Pugh also submitted an Affidavit of Attorney Re: Fees 
and Costs on the date of trial (R-123-144). The Trial Court took the matter under 
advisement and thereafter drafted and entered its own Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law (Included as Addendum 1 to Appellant's Brief) approximately one month 
following trial. A judgment in conformity with the Trial Court's findings and 
conclusions was entered on August 21, 1998 (R-165, 166, Included as Addendum F to 
this Brief). 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. On November 16, 1995, Pugh purchased a used 1990 Ford Thunderbird 
from St. George Motors. Stipulated Fact No. 1 (R-52). 
2. At the time Pugh purchased the vehicle, he also purchase a Vehicle 
Service Contract form North American which covered the vehicle for two years or 24,000 
miles, which ever occurred first. Stipulated Facts No.'s 3, 6 (R-52-53). 
3. On May 26, 1997, Pugh experienced transmission trouble between St. 
George and Cedar City, Utah, and was towed to Parkway Motors in Cedar City, Utah 
with approximately 5 miles remaining under the Vehicle Service Contract. Stipulated 
Facts No.'s 19, 20 and 21 (R-55). 
4. The Vehicle Service Contract provides that if a loss occurs within a 
warranty period and within the allowable mileage that North American "will either 
provide such repair or replacement (plus labor) himself, or reimburse an authorized repair 
facility to do so". Findings of Fact No. 3 (R-146). 
5. Pugh reported the transmission breakdown to North American within 24 
hours. Stipulated Fact No. 24 (R-55). 
6. Parkway Motors' mechanics removed the transmission pan and discovered 
metal shavings or filings in the pan, discolored transmission fluid that smelled burnt and 
evidence that the transmission fluid had leaked out of the rear housing seal. Stipulated 
Fact No. 25 (R-55). 
7. On May 30, 1997, North American's agent Ken Riddle went to Parkway 
Motors to inspect the vehicle. Parkway Motors mechanics informed Riddle of the metal 
flecks in the pan, the transmission fluid which smelled burnt and the leaks from the 
exterior housing seal, which facts Mr. Riddle included in his initial report to North 
American. Stipulated Facts No.'s 27, 28 (R-56). 
8. Pursuant to his instructions received from North American, Ken Riddle 
instructed Parkway Motors' mechanics to reinstall the transmission pan and fill the 
transmission with new oil. Whereupon, he test drove the vehicle for approximately 11 
miles, noting that the transmission shifted roughly into overdrive. Stipulated Facts No.'s 
26, 27, 28 (R-55-56). 
9. North American unreasonably limited the scoped of the investigation of 
Pugh's transmission problem by instructing Riddle, who is not a qualified mechanic, to 
only test-drive the vehicle. Findings of Fact 7 No. (R-146-147). 
10. The method of inspection of the transmission selected by North American 
was contrary to the standard practice which is to tear the transmission down and visually 
inspect it. In 12 years as an insurance claims adjuster, Ken Riddle had never been 
instructed to attempt to ascertain the condition of a transmission by simply driving it. 
Affidavit of Ken Riddle | 5 (R-86B). 
11. On the basis of Mr. Riddle's investigation, North American authorized 
only the replacement of the rear transmission seal. Findings of Fact No. 8 (R-147). 
12. Counsel for Pugh wrote to North American on June 11, 1997, and 
informed them that neither Pugh nor Parkway Motors mechanics, both of whom had 
expertise in transmission repair, believed that the proposed repairs were adequate. In the 
same letter Pugh demanded that North American repair or replace the transmission. 
Findings of Fact No.'s 7, 9, 10 (R-146-147). 
13. North American refused to further inspect or repair the vehicle, which 
remained at Parkway Motors in Cedar City, Utah, until November 24, 1997, when the 
parties entered into an "Interim Agreement" to tear down and inspect the transmission. 
Stipulated Fact No. 32 (R-56). 
14. The Interim Agreement provided that Pugh and North American would 
share the cost of the tear down unless it was determined that the transmission was broken 
or defective, in which case North American agreed to pay the entire cost of the tear down. 
Stipulated Fact No. 33 (R-56). 
15. On or about November 26, 1997, Parkway Motors tore down Pugh's 
transmission. Ken Riddle who inspected the torn down transmission, concluded that the 
transmission was defective or broken and that replacement was necessary. Findings of 
Fact No. 12 (R-147). 
16. On or about January 15, 1998, North American, through its general 
counsel, authorized Parkway Motors to repair Pugh's transmission on the condition that 
Pugh pay for the repairs pending reimbursement from North American. The procedure 
outlined by North American's counsel is contrary to the Vehicle Service Contract which 
provides that North American will pay the repair facility directly. Findings of Fact No.'s 
3, 13 (R-146-147). 
17. Pugh, who the Trial Court found lacked the financial ability to pay for the 
repair costs, gave Parkway Motors his authorization to perform the repairs but only if 
North American accepted responsibility to pay the bill. Findings of Fact No.'s 14, 15 (R-
148). 
18. Not until April 22, 1998, did North American agree to pay Parkway 
Motors for the repair costs. North American forwarded its check for the repair amount to 
Pugh. North American withheld one-half of the tear down costs from the check or 
$165.00 which it had previously agreed to pay under the Interim Agreement. Findings of 
Fact No. 17(R-148). 
19. North American delayed unreasonably in both investigating the loss and in 
authorizing and paying for covered repairs when the need was established. Then 
Defendant authorized repairs, but refused to follow the payment procedure required by 
the contract and finally, when Defendant proffered payment (almost 11 months after the 
loss), it deducted sums without justification and in direct contravention of the Interim 
Agreement. Findings of Fact No. 22 (R-149). 
20. Pugh, despite having the use of a company vehicle, drove the 1990 Ford 
Thunderbird approximately 24,000 miles during the 18 months preceding the 
transmission breakdown. Pugh used the vehicle for general transportation on a daily 
basis with the exception of three months out of the year when he drove his pick-up which 
is equipped for snow removal. Findings of Fact No.'s 16, 24 (R-149). 
21. Pugh was required to continue to make loan payments on his vehicle 
during the entire time it was disabled and there is no evidence that he realized any 
compensating savings as a result of the delay in repair. Findings of Fact No. 28 (R-150). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In virtually every point of the argument, Pugh contends that North American failed to 
preserve the issue on appeal or, in the alternative, North American's failure to include the trial 
transcript as a portion of the record, deprives this Court of the ability to determine if the issue 
was preserved on appeal or to determine the sufficiency of the evidence. Furthermore, North 
American's failure to designate the trial transcript as part of the record, by definition, makes it 
impossible for North American to marshal the evidence to successfully contest any of the Trial 
Court's Findings of Fact. 
Point I. North American's Vehicle Service Contract is a contract of insurance in 
the context of an award of attorney's fees as consequential damages. 
Point II. a. Pugh's Complaint sufficiently sets forth a claim for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith performance or, in the alternative, breach of the implied 
covenant was tried by consent pursuant to Rule 15(b) of the Utah R. Civ. P. 
b. Given the facts found by the Trial Court, North American's 
obligation to repair or replace Pugh's transmission was not fairly debatable. 
Point III, a. Pugh's duty to mitigate his damages did not require him to tear 
down the transmission in order to prove to North American that it was defective. 
b. The Trial Court's Findings of Fact amply support the Trial Court's 
award to Pugh for loss of use of his vehicle. 
Point IV. North American cannot challenge the sufficiency of the Findings of Fact 
without a trial transcript. 
Point V. To the extent that Pugh prevails on appeal, he should be entitled to recover 
attorney's fees on appeal. 
o 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY AWARDED PUGH 
ATTORNEY'S FEES BASED ON NORTH AMERICANS BREACH 
OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH 
PERFORMANCE. 
North American argues that the Trial Court's award of attorney's fees as 
consequential damages was erroneous because its Vehicle Service Contract1 is not a 
contract of insurance. Although North American fails to note it, the argument 
specifically challenges the Trial Court's Conclusion of Law No. 11 (R 152) which, in 
pertinent part, provides, "the warranty contract at issue is an insurance contract for 
purposes of an award of attorney's fees...". Accordingly, the appropriate standard of 
review for the challenged conclusion of law would be one of correctness. State v. Pena, 
supra. 
The issue which North American requests this Court to review on appeal is found 
nowhere in the record. While Pugh clearly requests an award of attorney's fees as 
consequential damages for North American's failure to honor its obligations (Complaint 
116 R-1C, ID), North American's Answer (R-6-10) fails to allege that consequential 
damages are unavailable because its Vehicle Service Contract is not a contract of 
insurance. Likewise, Defendant's Trial Memorandum (R-87-113) is wholly devoid of 
any argument that the service contract is not a contract of insurance. Any argument that 
might have been made at trial is not before this court because North American elected not 
to obtain a transcript of the proceedings before the Trial Court. See Rule 11(e)(1) 
Certificate (R-173). 
1
 The terminology "Vehicle Service Contract" refers only to the title North Amencan itself selected for its 
contract and in no way identifies the instrument as a "service contract" as the same is defined in Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-6a-101 etseq 
Q 
Because North American has not preserved the issue on appeal, this Court has not 
been afforded an opportunity to rule whether North American's Vehicle Service Contract 
is a contract of insurance or not. In 1997, this Court clearly and concisely set forth the 
requisites of preserving an issue on appeal in Hart v. Salt Lake County Com 'n, 945 P. 2d 
125 (Utah Ct.App. 1997): 
To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must first raise the issue 
before the trial court.. ..Second, the issue must be specifically raised such 
that the issue is sufficiently raised to a "level of consciousness" before the 
trial court.. ..Third, the party must introduce to the trial court "supporting 
evidence or relevant legal authority" to support its argument. 
Hart at 130 (citations omitted). In the present case, the record is devoid of anything 
which would indicate that the requisites of preserving the issue were satisfied. Therefore, 
this Court lacks any capacity to review the issue presented by North American. 
Assuming, arguendo, that North American somehow preserved the issue on 
appeal, North American's assertion that its Vehicle Service Contract is not a contract of 
insurance is based on conclusory and faulty reasoning. North American's argument is as 
follows: 
Premise one: North American's Vehicle Service Contract is a "service 
contract" under the statutory definition set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§31A-6a-101 etseq.\ 
Premise two: Service contracts are exempt from the Utah Insurance Code; 
Conclusion: North America's Vehicle Service Contract is not a contract of 
insurance. 
North American's first premise is conclusory and erroneous as described below. 
However,.the larger defect in North American's argument is that the conclusion does not 
logically follow even if the premises are accepted. Exemption of a contract from the 
insurance code does not eliminate it as a contract of insurance. Rather, it means only that 
the contract and its provider are not subject to the regulatory scheme set forth in the 
insurance code. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-l-103(3)(j) does not imply that service contracts 
are not contracts of insurance; rather, it provides that "this title does not apply 
to.. .service contract". 
The controlling issue is not whether North American's contract is exempt from 
the Utah Insurance Code; but, whether it is an insurance contract under the line of cases 
in which Utah court's have allowed recovery of attorney's fees as consequential 
damages . The Trial Court clearly understood the context within which it determined if 
North American's Service Contract was a contract of insurance "[T]he warranty contract 
at issue is an insurance contract for the purposes of an award of attorney's fees." 
Conclusion of Law No. 11 (R-152)(Emphasis added). 
Unfortunately, neither Beck v. Farmer's, supra, nor any of its progeny have 
specifically defined a "contract of insurance" for the purpose of assessing attorney's fees 
as a consequential damage. However, relevant and authoritative sources demonstrate that 
North American's Service Contract is a contract of insurance for the purpose of awarding 
attorney's fees. North American cites the Utah Insurance Code definition of insurance as 
2
 Beck v Farmer's Insurance Company, 701 P 2d 795 (Utah 1985), Zion 's First National Bank v National 
American Title Insurance, 749 P.2d 651 (Utah 1988); Canyon Country Store v Bracey, 781 P 2d 414 (Utah 
1989); Billings v Union Banker's Insurance Company, 918 P.2d 461 (Utah 1996); Castillo v Atlanta 
Casualty, 939 P.2d 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); and Gibbs M Smith, Inc v US Fidelity, 949 P.2d 337 
(Utah 1997). 
"[A]ny arrangement, contract or plan for the transfer of a risk or risks from one or more 
persons to one or more other persons...." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(40). At page 12 
of Appellant's Brief, North America implicitly acknowledges that that definition would 
encompass its Vehicle Service Contract. North American cannot, in good faith, claim 
that its contract does not transfer the risk of damage or mechanical failure of Pugh's car 
to North American. Black's Law Dictionary gives a more generic definition of 
insurance: 
An agreement by which one party for a consideration promises to pay money or 
its equivalent or to do an act valuable to other party upon destruction, loss or 
injury of something in which other party has an interest. 
Black's Law Dictionary 712 (5th ed. 1979). Under its Vehicle Service Contract, North 
American, in exchange for Pugh's premium, promised to repair Pugh's vehicle in the 
event of a loss. Accordingly, the Vehicle Service Contract had all of the characteristics 
of insurance. 
While Beck v. Farmer's Insurance Company and its progeny do not specifically 
define a contract of insurance, the case law does set forth policy reasons why 
consequential damages under insurance contracts should be treated differently than they 
are in other contracts: 
[A] broad range of recoverable damages is conceivable, particularly given 
the unique nature and purpose of an insurance contract. An insured 
frequently faces catastrophic consequences if funds are not available 
within a reasonable period of time to cover an insured loss; damages for 
losses well in excess of the policy limit such as for home or business may 
therefore be foreseeable and provable 
Beck at 802. Those same policy considerations adhere in the contract between North 
American and Pugh. Because North American refused to cover the damages within a 
reasonable time, Pugh who had limited funds, was left without a way to effect the repairs. 
See Finding of Fact No. 14 (R-148). As a result, Pugh faced the harsh consequence of 
being without his vehicle for over a year, which gave rise to foreseeable and provable 
consequential damages for loss of use of the vehicle and for attorney's fees which he 
incurred in pursuing North American. Not only does North American's Service Contract 
meet the normal and commonsensical definitions of an insurance contract, but the 
relationship between North American and Pugh is that of insurer and insured. That 
relationship gives rise to the precise policy considerations which Utah courts have 
addressed in granting attorney's fees as consequential damages in Beck and its progeny. 
Even if this Court concludes that contracts must be governed by the Utah 
Insurance Code to give rise to an award of attorney's fees as consequential damages, 
Pugh is entitled to recover the same under his contract with North American. Under the 
statutory scheme set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-6a-101 et seq., North American's 
contract with Pugh is a "mechanical breakdown insurance" policy rather than a "service 
contract". The statutory distinction between a service contract and a mechanical 
breakdown contract is not in the coverage of the policy. Both contracts provide 
essentially the same coverage. However, mechanical breakdown insurance is issued 
directly by an insurance company that is subject to the provisions of the insurance code. 
Whereas, a service contract need not be written by an insurance company so long as it is 
underwritten by "reimbursement insurance" which is issued by an insurance company 
subject to the regulation of the Utah Insurance Code. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-6a-102(6). 
In order to be issued in Utah, a service contract must contain the following 
statements: 
"Obligations of the provider under this service contract are guaranteed 
under a service contract reimbursement contract insurance policy" (Utah 
Code Ann. § 31 A-6a-104(2)). 
"Coverage afforded into this contract is not guaranteed by the property and 
casualty guarantee association" (Utah Code Ann. § 31A-6a-105(l 1)). 
Because North American's Vehicle Service Contract (R-163-164) contains neither 
of the required disclosures, it is clear that the contract cannot be a service contract. The 
only possible alternative is that North American's contract is a mechanical breakdown 
policy which is subject to the provisions of the Utah Insurance Code. Accordingly, North 
American's Vehicle Service Contract would be a contract of insurance even under the 
restrictive definition which is advanced in Appellant's Brief. 
On a collateral note, "Insurance business" is defined under the Utah Insurance 
Code to include, "(d).. ..providing the characteristics services of Motor Clubs as outlined 
in Subsection (56)." Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-1-301(44). Motor Clubs are defined under 
the Utah Insurance Code as providing, among other things, trip reimbursement, towing 
services and emergency road services. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(56). North 
American's contract with Pugh included emergency travel reimbursement, towing and 
24-hour roadside assistance. All of the foregoing are characteristic of Motor Clubs and 
included within the coverage of the Utah Insurance Code. Accordingly, even if North 
American's contract was found to meet the statutory definition of a service contract, the 
inclusion of services characteristic of Motor Clubs would bring the contract within the 
application of the insurance code and North American's own restrictive definition of an 
insurance contract. 
The Trial Court drew a specific conclusion that North American's Vehicle 
Service Contract was a contract of insurance for the purpose of awarding attorney's fees 
as consequential damages. Based on the record before the Court, North American failed 
to preserve that issue on appeal. Regardless of whether North American's Vehicle 
Service Contract falls under the regulatory scheme of the Utah Insurance Code, it is 
essentially a contract of insurance which is subject to the unique policy considerations of 
insurance which were set forth in Beck v. Farmer ys Insurance Company, supra.. 
Accordingly, there is no reason to disturb the Trial Court's Conclusion of Law that North 
American's policy represented a contract of insurance. And therefore the Trial Court's 
award of attorney's fees to Pugh as consequential damages should be upheld. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
WAS ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED BY PLEADING, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND EVIDENCE. 
A. Pugh Sufficiently Pleaded Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith 
Performance. 
North American raises, for the first time on appeal, the argument that the Trial 
Court's award of attorney's fees as consequential damages for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith performance is error because it was not properly pleaded. 
Because North American failed to raise this issue before the trial court, it is deemed 
waived. "Issues not raised in the trial court in a timely fashion are deemed waived, 
precluding the [Appellate Court] from considering their merits on appeal." Ohline Corp. 
v. Granite Mill 849 P.2d 602, 604 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
While the Complaint does not set forth a separately identified cause of action for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith performance, it does set forth sufficient facts 
and elements to fairly apprise North American of Pugh's claim. Paragraphs 13, 14 and 
15 of the Complaint set forth the operative facts of a claim for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith performance. (R-1C). Paragraph 13 alleges North American's 
refusal to repair the vehicle despite the fact the policy was in effect and the repairs were 
covered by the terms of the policy. Paragraph 14 alleges North American's failure to 
diligently investigate the claim to determine whether it was valid or not. Paragraph 15 
alleges Pugh's loss of use of his vehicle as a consequence of North American's failure to 
repair the vehicle. 
Notably, Pugh alleges that he has suffered consequential damages for the loss of 
the use of the vehicle and for the attorney's fees which he had incurred in pursuing the 
claim in paragraph 16 of the Complaint (R-1C, ID). The claim for consequential 
damages is carried forward in paragraph 21 of the First Cause of Action as well as in the 
Prayer for Relief. The law in Utah was well established at the time the Complaint was 
filed on July 25, 1997, that attorney's fees could be awarded as consequential damages in 
a first party contract of insurance only upon the insurance company's breach of the 
implied covenant to perform its insurance contracts in good faith. Collier v. Heinz, 827 
P2.d 982, 984 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Accordingly, the tell-tale requests for attorney's 
fees as consequential damages gave North American fair warning that Pugh had 
incorporated a breach of the implied covenant of good faith performance into his 
Complaint. 
Even if this Court determines that the breach of implied covenant of good faith 
performance theory was not adequately pleaded by Pugh in his Complaint, it was 
nonetheless appropriate for the Trial Court to consider evidence submitted on that theory 
and grant recovery thereon because the issue was tried by consent. Rule 15(b) of the 
Utah R. Civ. P. specifically allows the trial court to consider and rule on issues not 
presented in the pleadings if they are tried by express or implied consent of the parties. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the 
pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be 
treated in all respects as if they have been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the 
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any 
time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the 
trial of these issues.... 
Rule 15(b) Utah R. Civ. P.. In Plaintiffs Trial Brief (R-l 16-118) Pugh 
specifically pointed out that his breach of contract claim encompassed a claim for North 
American's breach of the implied covenant to perform in good faith. Citing the standards 
set forth in Beck, Canyon Country Store, and Castillo, Pugh continued in his Trial Brief 
to explain the availability of attorney's fees as consequential damages for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Prior to trial, the parties entered into a Statement of Stipulated Facts. (R-52-86). 
North American stipulated to the admission of facts addressing the diligence and 
adequacy of North American's inspection of the vehicle. Statement of Stipulated Facts fflf 
27-29 (R-56). Further, North American stipulated to the introduction of facts relating to 
North American's protracted refusal to repair the vehicle or further examine it to 
determine the validity of the claim. Statement of Stipulated Facts fflf 30-35 (R-57). 
Finally, North American stipulated to the admission of facts concerning its refusal to pay 
for the repairs of the vehicle for several months even after it acknowledged the 
transmission needed to be replaced. Statement of Stipulated Facts 1fl[ 36-39 (R-57). 
North American's stipulation to facts which logically pertain to Pugh's claim for 
breach of implied covenant of good faith performance constitutes express consent to try 
that issue. At a minimum, North American impliedly consented to try the breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith performance by failing to object to testimony thereon 
given by Pugh at trial and by failing to object to the introduction of the Affidavit of 
Attorney Re Fees and Costs. (R-123-144). "A party may give implied consent when it 
does not object to the introduction of evidence at trial." General Insurance Company of 
America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1976) and Keller v. 
Southwood North Medical Pavilion, 959 P.2d 102, 105 (Utah 1998). 
Pugh cannot substantiate the absence of objection at trial other than by 
recollection because no trial transcript was requested by North American. However, 
Pugh should in nowise be prejudiced by North American's failure to request pertinent 
portions of the transcript. Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides 
in pertinent part: 
[T]he appellant shall request from the court executive a transcript of such 
parts of a proceeding not already on file as the appellant deems necessary... 
neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's 
deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the transcript. 
Utah R. App. P. 11(e). The Utah Supreme Court, in Horton v Gem State Mutual of Utah, 
19A P.2d 847 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), stated that the appellant has the burden of providing 
an adequate record to preserve each of its arguments for review. Horton at 849 (citations 
omitted). Based on North American's failure to obtain a transcript, it cannot now sustain 
the claim that breach of the implied covenant of good faith performance was not properly 
before the Trial Court either by express or implied consent. 
B. The Trial Court Entered Adequate Findings of North American's Breach of the 
Implied Covenant of Good Faith Performance. 
In a single sentence, which is unsupported by citation to the record or any legal 
authority, North American makes the bold assertion that the Trial Court made no findings 
that North American had violated its duty of good faith performance and therefore the 
award of attorney's fees was improper. (Appellant's Brief page 16). To determine 
whether the court made any findings related to North American's breach of an obligation 
of good faith performance, it is first necessary to state the standard: 
[T]he implied obligation of good faith performance contemplates, at the 
very least, that the insurer will diligently investigate the facts to enable it 
to determine whether a claim is valid, will fairly evaluate the claim, and 
will thereafter act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim. 
Beck at 801. Given that standard or definition of goof faith performance, the Findings of 
Fact drafted by the Trial Court are replete with findings supporting North American's 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith performance. No less than eight of the 
Findings of Fact drafted by the Trial Court address good faith performance: 
f7. Following the breakdown on May 26, 1997, Defendant instructed its agent 
Ken Riddle to perform a visual inspection and test drive on May 30, 1997. 
The inspection was timely, but Mr. Riddle is not a qualified mechanic and 
Defendant unreasonably limited the scope of the investigation. This was 
done despite the fact that both Plaintiff and the repair facility, both of 
whom possess expertise in transmission repair, opined that the 
transmission must be repaired or replaced (R-146, 147). (Failure to 
diligently investigate the facts and fairly evaluate the claim). 
If 11. Defendant refused further repair until and Interim Agreement was 
negotiated between the parties on November 24, 1997, whereby the parties 
agreed to share the cost of a transmission tear down by Parkway Motors. 
The agreement provided that if the inspection determined the transmission 
was broken or defective, Defendant would pay the entire cost of the tear 
down (R-147). {Failure to diligently investigate the facts and to act 
promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim). 
f 12. On or about January 15, 1998, Defendant, through its general counsel, 
authorized the repair, but counsel instructed to Parkway Motors that 
Plaintiff would have to pay for the repairs himself and Defendant would 
reimburse him (R-147). {Failure to act promptly and reasonably in 
rejecting or settling a claim). 
^16. Not until April 22, 1998, did Defendant agree with Plaintiff and Parkway 
Motors to pay the repair costs (R-148). (Failure to act promptly and 
reasonably in rejecting or settling a claim). 
117. On May 1, 1998, Plaintiff received Defendant's check in the amount of 
$2,467.47, in partial settlement of the transmission repair. The check was 
$225.00 less than the repair estimate, because Defendant withheld the 
agreed reimbursement for a Plaintiffs share of tear down costs ($165.00 
and $60.00 freight charges for part needed to complete repairs.) (R-148). 
(Failure to act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling a claim). 
1J20. There was substantial evidence that the transmission needed to be replaced 
from the first inspection by Defendant's agent, Ken Riddle, which 
occurred on or about May 30, 1997, but Defendant refused to either accept 
the evidence or pursue additional investigation, at its expense, which 
investigation would have resolved the question (R-148, 149). {Failure to 
diligently investigate the facts, failure to fairly evaluate the claim and 
failure to act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling a claim). 
f21. Defendant delayed unreasonably in both investigating the loss and in 
authorizing and paying for covered repairs when the need was established. 
The delay resulted in part from Defendant's concern that Plaintiff may 
have somehow manipulated the claim to defraud the company, but the 
court finds absolutely no evidence of any such conduct or intent on 
Plaintiffs part (R-149). (Failure to diligently investigate the facts and 
failure to act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim). 
f22. Even after the repair need was established to the satisfaction of both 
Parkway Motors, and Ken Riddle, Defendant's own agent, and no 
evidence of fraud was adduced, Defendant first delayed in authorizing the 
repairs, then Defendant authorized repairs but refused to follow the 
payment procedure required by the contract and, finally, when Defendant 
proffered payment, almost eleven months after the loss), it deducted sums 
without justification and in direct contravention of the Interim Agreement 
(R-149). (Failure to act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling 
the claim). 
The Findings of Fact prepared by the Trial Court more than adequately set forth North 
American's breach of the implied covenant of good faith performance. 
C. North American's Obligation to Repair Pugh's Vehicle Was Not "Fairly 
Debatable." 
On Page 17 of Appellant's Brief, North American raises for the first time the 
purported defense that its obligation to cover Pugh's claim was "fairly debatable," 
Again, the record is devoid of any evidence that North American raised the issue in a 
timely fashion, that it was raised to a "level of consciousness" before the Trial Court or 
that North American ever submitted any supporting evidence or relevant legal authority 
concerning the defense. Therefore, based on Hart v. Salt Lake County Commission, 
supra, North American has failed to preserve the issue on appeal depriving this Court of 
the capacity to review it. 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that North American somehow preserved the 
issue for appeal, the facts in the record belie the defense, rather than support it. North 
American cites Billings v. Union Banker's Ins, Co., supra, for the proposition that an 
insurer's wrongful denial of coverage is a question of law" to be reviewed for 
correctness. North American misstates the standard of review set forth in Billings. In 
headnote 2 of the text of the Billings decision, the Utah Supreme Court commences its 
analysis indicating that the interpretation afforded to a prior judicial decision by trial 
court is a conclusion of law which is reviewed for correctness. Billings at 464. After 
first answering the inquiry as to whether Beck v. Farmer }s Insurance established a "fairly 
debatable defense", the court indicated that the trial court's actual determination whether 
coverage was fairly debatable or not is subject to a standard of review somewhat less 
stringent than correctness. 
Whether an insured's claim is fairly debatable under a given set of facts, is 
also a question of law... However because of the complexity and variety 
of the facts upon which the fairly debatable determination depends, the legal 
standard under which this determination is made conveys some discretion 
to trial judges... Therefore, although we will carefully review a trial court's 
conclusion that an insured's claim is or is not fairly debatable, we will grant 
the trial court's conclusion some deference. 
Billings at 464 (citations omitted). 
The Conclusions of Law drafted by the Trial Court, do not address the fairly 
debatable defense, which is evidence that the issue was not raised before the Trial Court. 
However, the Trial Court did definitively find that North American breached its 
contractual good faith performance obligation. Conclusion of Law 2 provides: 
2. Defendant's breaches included failure to investigate the extent of damage, 
failure to promptly authorize and pay for repairs in the manner provided 
for in the contract, both before and after the teardown, failure to honor the 
Interim Agreement regarding tear down costs and repair when the extent 
of damage was ascertained, and failure to follow contract procedures when 
responsibility was ultimately accepted. 
Conclusion of Law of No. 2. (R 150). The unequivocal finding that North American 
breached the implied covenant of good faith performance is antithetical of and excludes a 
determination that Pugh's claim was fairly debatable. 
North American invites this Court to overturn the Trial Court's conclusion on an 
incorrect standard of review based on several incomplete or partial facts. Under the 
standard of review set forth in Billings, this Court must grant some deference to the Trial 
Court's conclusion that North American breached its contractual obligation of good faith 
performance because of the fact-intensive nature of that determination. The partial facts 
cited by North American do not justify disturbing the conclusion of the Trial Court when 
viewed in light of the totality of facts and circumstances which were presented to the 
Trial Court. 
North American cites the fact that it had paid previous claims under the Vehicle 
Service Contract with Mr. Pugh. While laudable, payment of prior claims has no bearing 
on whether North American's coverage of this claim was fairly debatable. North 
American cites a portion of Finding of Fact No. 7 which states that Ken Riddle's 
inspection of the car was timely. The remainder of the Finding, which North American 
neglected to include, recites that Mr. Riddle was not a qualified mechanic and that North 
American unreasonably limited the scope of its investigation. Further, the Trial Court 
found that North American elected to perform the limited investigation (test driving the 
vehicle for 11 miles) despite evidence that the transmission needed to be repaired or 
replaced which was received from mechanics at Parkway Motors and Pugh who had 
expertise in transmission repair. Finding of Fact No. 7 (R-146-147). 
North American recites that during the test-drive the only thing that Mr. Riddle 
noticed was that the vehicle shifted hard into overdrive. North American omits that in 
Riddle's report prepared for North American, he stated that the transmission pan had 
metal flecks in it, that the transmission fluid smelled burnt, and that there were leaks from 
the exterior housing seal. Stipulated Fact No. 28 (R-56). North American omits that in 
Mr. Riddle's Affidavit, which was admitted into evidence pursuant to paragraph 43 of the 
Statement of Stipulated Facts (R-58), Riddle states that in 12 years in the adjusting field, 
he had never been instructed to attempt to ascertain the condition of the transmission by 
simply driving it and that the standard practice in the industry is to tear the transmission 
down and visually inspect it. Affidavit of Ken Riddle Paragraph 4 and 5 (R-86B). 
Furthermore, North American omits the sworn statement of Mr. Riddle that North 
American did not ask for his opinion; they asked him to report on how the vehicle drove 
and any transmission problems noted during the test drive. Affidavit of Ken Riddle 
Paragraph 10 (R-86C). Finally, North American omitted the finding of the Trial Court 
that "[T]here was substantial evidence that the transmission needed to be replaced from 
the first inspection by Defendant's agent Ken Riddle which occurred on or about May 30, 
1997, but Defendant refused to either accept the evidence or pursue additional 
investigation at its expense, which investigation would have resolved the question." 
Finding of Fact No. 20 (R-148-149). 
Given the totality of the facts and circumstances before the Trial Court, its 
conclusion that North American had breached it contractual obligation of good faith 
performance, which must be accorded some deference by this Court, is overwhelmingly 
supported by uncontested facts in the case. Accordingly, the fairly debatable defense, if 
it indeed was preserved at the trial level, is unsupported under the facts of the present 
case. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED PUGH 
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES FOR THE LOSS OF USE 
OF HIS VEHICLE. 
A. Pugh Was Not Required to Tear Down or Repair His Vehicle in Order to Mitigate His 
Damages. 
North American argues that Pugh should not have been awarded the loss of use of his 
vehicle as a consequential damage of North American's own breach of its implied 
obligation of good faith performance because he allegedly failed to mitigate his damages. 
After North American inspected the car by test driving it for 11 miles and refused to 
perform any repair other than replacement of a rear transmission seal, North American 
claims that Pugh should have torn the transmission down, at his own expense, in order to 
prove to North American that the transmission was bad and needed to be replaced. North 
American claims that it had no authority to request diagnostic tests and that tearing down 
the transmission was the "providence and responsibility" of Pugh. (Appellant's Brief 
page 18). 
To comply with a duty to mitigate damages, Pugh need not take any and all 
possible actions to diminish or minimize his own damages. The appropriate standard 
under Utah law is that Pugh take reasonable actions to mitigate his damages. 
In order to submit the issue of mitigation to the jury, there must be competent 
evidence to show that the Plaintiff failed to take reasonable efforts to mitigate his 
damages John Call Engineering v. Manti City 795 P.2d 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
citing Barnes v. Lopez 544 P.2d 694, 698 (Arizona App. 1976). (Emphasis 
added). 
It remains, therefore, to determine whether, under the circumstances of this case, it would 
have been reasonable to require Pugh to undertake the actions postulated by North 
American. 
If Pugh were required to tear down his transmission or perform diagnostic tests 
thereon to satisfy a duty to mitigate damages, the duty of good faith performance would 
be eliminated. The rationale for the adoption of the implied obligation of good faith 
performance was the peculiar relationship which exists between insurers and insured and 
the relative powerlessness of the latter in the context of claim settlements. 
An insured who has suffered a loss and is pressed financially is at a marked 
disadvantage when bargaining with an insurer over payment for that loss. Failure 
to accept a proper settlement, although less than fair, can lead to catastrophic 
consequence for an insured who, as a direct consequence of the loss, may be 
peculiarly vulnerable, both economically and emotionally. 
Beck at 798. The insurer's good faith performance obligations to diligently investigate 
the facts to enable it to determine validity of a claim, the duty to fairly evaluate the claim 
and after act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling the same were intended to 
secure the benefit of what the insured had bargained and paid for. Under these 
circumstances, it would not be reasonable to allow North American to escape the implied 
obligation of good faith performance by transferring those obligations to Pugh under the 
guise of mitigation of damages. 
The determination whether the Vehicle Service Contract covered repair or 
replacement of Pugh's transmission ultimately had to be made by North American. 
Requiring Pugh to accept the financial burden of making that determination and requiring 
him, in effect, to prove coverage under the Vehicle Service Contract is patently 
unreasonable. North American's flat refusal to sufficiently investigate Pugh's claim to 
determine whether it was valid or not cannot be condoned by then requiring Pugh to 
perform North American's obligation under the rubric of mitigating damages. If nothing 
else, that would shift the economic burden of making the coverage determination to Pugh 
despite the Court's finding that he lacked the financial ability to pay for repair costs. 
Finding of Fact No. 14 (R-148). 
Even if Pugh were financially able to pay for the cost of tearing down the 
transmission or other diagnostic tests, such action would have jeopardized his claim 
under the terms of the Vehicle Service Contract. Under exclusion number 5 to the 
Vehicle Service Contract, any "alteration, tampering, disconnection, improper 
adjustments or repairs" would result in an exclusion of coverage. The contract is replete 
with conditions that exclude coverage for repairs not authorized in advance. 
THE ADMINISTRATOR MUST BE CONTACTED PRIOR TO THE 
PERFORMANCE OF ANY REPAIR. THE ADMINISTRATOR WILL NOT BE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY REPAIRS THAT ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO 
THE REPAIR FACILITY (R-1I). 
ANY REPAIRS PERFORMED TO THE COVERED VEHICLE NOT 
SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED BY US VIA AN AUTHORIZATION 
NUMBER ARE NOT COVERED (R-1I). 
PRIOR TO PROCEEDING WITH REPAIRS, ENSURE THAT THE ISSUING 
DEALER OR AUTHORIZED FACILITY CALLS THE ADMINISTRATOR OR 
OBTAINS AUTHORIZATION TO PROCEED WITH THE REPAIR (R-l J). 
IMPORTANT: PURCHASER ASSUMES ALL LIABILITY FOR PAYMENT 
OF REPAIRS THAT ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO THE REPAIR FACILITY 
(R-1J). 
THE ADMINISTRATOR RESERVES THE RIGHT TO INSPECT THE 
COVERED VEHICLE PRIOR TO THE PERFORMANCE OF REPAIR OR 
REPLACEMENT (R-lJ). 
The terms of the Vehicle Service Contract make it clear that Pugh could not have had the 
transmission removed from the car, torn down, or subjected to diagnostic tests without 
jeopardizing his coverage under the Vehicle Service Contract. Under those 
circumstances it is clearly unreasonable to have required Pugh to tear down the 
transmission or attempt its repair in order to mitigate his damages. 
North American cannot escape the implied obligation of good faith performance 
by requiring Pugh to perform in its stead. It is not reasonable to require Pugh to prove to 
North American that his claim was covered. Likewise it was not reasonable to require 
Pugh to remove the transmission, tear it down and perform diagnostic tests thereon when 
those actions would exclude or provide North American with an argument to exclude 
coverage under the contract. Finally, it was not reasonable to require Pugh to accept the 
financial responsibility to perform North American's obligations under the contract. 
Given the foregoing, Pugh did not unreasonably fail to mitigate his damages and should 
be awarded the loss of the use of the car. 
B. Sufficient Evidence Was Before the Trial Court to Support the Award to Pugh of 
the Loss of Use of His Vehicle. 
North American attacks the sufficiency of the evidence to support the award to 
Pugh of the loss of use of his vehicle or, logically, to support Findings of Fact thereon 
entered by the Trial Court. Because North American did not obtain a trial transcript 
which would consist largely of the sworn testimony of Pugh, this Court is now incapable 
of making any determination of that issue. Absent the trial transcript, Appellant's claim 
of error is merely an unsupported unilateral allegation which we cannot resolve. Horton 
v. Gemstate Mutual, 19A P.2d at 849. On the basis of the record submitted by North 
American, it is not even, clear that the issue of proof of damages was preserved for 
appeal. 
North American first argues that Pugh failed to submit any evidence concerning 
the damages he sustained by being deprived of the use of his car. Based on the absence 
of a trial transcript, it is difficult to confirm or deny that issue. However, Finding of Fact 
No. 28 demonstrates that Pugh was required to continue to make loan payments while he 
was deprived of the use of his car. A transcript of his testimony would likewise include 
testimony that Pugh was required to maintain full insurance coverage on the vehicle at 
the insistence of his lien holder for the full year that he did not have possession of the 
vehicle. The trial record would also include testimony that Pugh paid title, registration 
and taxes on the vehicle while being deprived of the use thereof. 
Despite the absence of a trial transcript, North American agues that Pugh 
provided no evidence that he would have driven the vehicle if he had not been deprived 
of the use thereof. That is the successful defense which was mounted by the defendant in 
Castillo v. Atlanta Casualty Co., supra. Findings of Fact entered by the Trial Court again 
belie that contention. Finding of Fact No. 26 reflects that Pugh drove his vehicle 
approximately 24,000 during the 18 months prior to the breakdown or the equivalent of 
more than 15,750 miles per year (R-149). The Trial Court also found that Pugh likely 
would not have used the vehicle for approximately 3 months out of the year while he 
drove his pick-up which is equipped for snow removal. Finding of Fact No. 24 (R-149). 
The Trial Court, accordingly, diminished Pugh's award for loss of use of vehicle by that 
3-month period. 
Finally, North American makes the argument that Pugh would not have driven his 
car, if he had not been deprived of the use thereof, because he had access to a company 
truck. This argument is completely unpersuasive because Pugh drove his vehicle 
approximately 24,000 in the 18 months preceding the breakdown, even though he had 
access to the company vehicle at that time as well. The Findings of Fact drafted by the 
Court are adequate to show that Pugh would have driven his car daily for at least 9 
months out of the year that he was deprived of the use thereof. 
POINT IV. NORTH AMERICAN CANNOT CHALLENGE THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT WITHOUT 
PROVIDING A TRIAL TRANSCRIPT AND 
MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE. 
The standard of review applicable to attacks on the Trial Court's Findings of Fact 
is the "clearly erroneous" standard under which broad deference is accorded to the trial 
court State v. Pena at 935. In recognition of that broad discretion accorded to the Trial 
Court, Appellant's must marshall all the evidence in order to challenge a finding of fact. 
In order to challenge the Trial Court's Findings of Fact, appellant must first 
marshall the evidence which supports the finding and then demonstrate that 
despite this evidence, they are clearly erroneous. Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744, 
747 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In order to marshall evidence, the appellant must first 
recite all the evidence supporting the challenged findings and then demonstrate 
that the marshalled evidence is legally insufficient to support those findings when 
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viewing the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the decision. 
Stewart v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 131, 138 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
In light of the fact that North American failed to obtain a trial transcript, it is 
impossible for North American to marshall the evidence in order to mount a successful 
challenge against the Trial Court's Findings of Fact. Moreover, North American fails to 
make any effort to marshall facts which support Findings of Fact 6, 20 and 21 which it 
challenges. Rather, North American limits it analysis to evidence which it alleges is 
contrary to the facts. "When Appellant attacks the evidence, we begin our analysis with 
the Trial Court's Findings of Fact, not with an appellant's view of the way the trial court 
should have found." Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah 1987). Based on the 
foregoing, this Court should reject North American's challenge to the Trial Court's 
Findings of Fact. 
POINT V. PUGH SHOULD BE AWARDED HIS COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL AS WELL AS AT TRIAL. 
The Trial Court awarded Pugh his attorney's fees as consequential damages under 
his Vehicle Service Contact with North American Warranty. If Pugh prevails or 
substantially prevails on appeal, he should also be awarded attorney's fees incurred on 
appeal. In 1980 the Utah Supreme Court adopted the rule of law that "a provision for 
payment of attorney's fees in a contract includes attorney's fees incurred by the 
prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial." Management Services v. Development 
Associates, 617 P.2d 406 (Utah 1980). Since then, the rule of law which permits 
recovery of contract-based attorney's fees appeal has been extended to domestic litigants, 
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 
1027 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (generally, when the trial court awards fees in a domestic 
action to the party who then substantially prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to 
that party on appeal); to mechanic's lien claimants Martindale v. Adams, 111 P.2d 514, 
518 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ( Attorney's fees on appeal awarded on basis of underlying 
award of fees on mechanic's lien statute); to attorney's fees awarded for bad faith Utah 
Department of Social Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ( 
Attorney's fees on finding of bad faith under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 are also 
recoverable by prevailing party on appeal). 
To the extent that Pugh prevails or substantially prevails on the appeal of the 
present case, he should also be awarded his attorney's fees on appeal. If the fees awarded 
by the Trial Court were foreseeable consequential damages arising from North 
American's breach of the implied covenant of good faith performance, then fees incurred 
by Pugh successfully defending this appeal must also be foreseeable consequential 
damages. Accordingly, if Pugh prevails or substantially prevails on the present appeal, 
he respectfully requests that the Court remand the matter to the Trial Court with 
instructions to make a determination of Pugh's costs and attorney's fees incurred on 
appeal and to award the same to him as an element of his consequential damages. 
CONCLUSION 
Pugh respectfully requests that this Court uphold the Trial Court's award of 
attorney's fees in the sum of $6,426.00 and the award for loss of use of vehicle in the sum 
of $6,750.00 and for other miscellaneous items included in the judgment, but not 
challenged on appeal in the sum of $466.50. Additionally, Pugh requests that this Court 
award him reasonably incurred costs and attorney's fees on appeal in an amount to be 
determined by the Trial Court on remand. 
Respectfully submitted this day of July, 1999. 
PETERSON REED L.L.C. 
11 S. Peterson 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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UT ST § 31A-1-301, De f in i t i ons 
Utah Code § 31 A-l-301 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE 
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL 
PROVISIONS 
PART HI. DEFINITIONS 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in 
this document) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess. 
§ 31 A-l-301. Definitions 
As used in this title, unless otherwise specified: 
(0.5) "Administrator" is defined in Subsection 
(77). 
(1) "Adult" means a natural person who has 
attained the age of at least 18 years. 
(2) "Affiliate" means any person who controls, 
is controlled by, or is under common control with, 
another person. A corporation is an affiliate of 
another corporation, regardless of ownership, if 
substantially the same group of natural persons 
manages the corporations. 
(3) "Alien insurer" means an insurer domiciled 
outside the United States. 
(4) "Annuities" means all agreements to make 
periodical payments for a period certain or over 
the lifetime of one or more natural persons if the 
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making or continuance of all or some of the series 
of the payments, or the amount of the payment, is 
dependent upon the continuance of human life. 
(5) "Articles" or "articles of incorporation" 
means the original articles, special laws, charters, 
amendments, restated articles, articles of merger 
or consolidation, trust instruments, and other 
constitutive documents for trusts and other 
entities that are not corporations, and amendments 
to any of these. Refer also to "bylaws" in this 
section and Section 31A-5-203. 
(6) "Bail bond insurance" means a guarantee 
that a person will attend court when requiied, or 
will obey the orders or judgment of the couit, as a 
condition to the release of that person from 
confinement. 
(7) "Binder" is defined in Section 31A-21-102. 
(8) "Board," "board of trustees," or "board of 
directors" means the group of persons with 
responsibility over, or management of, a 
corporation, however designated. Refer also to 
"trustee" in this section. 
(9) "Business of insurance" is defined in 
Subsection (44). 
(10) "Business plan" means the infonnation 
required to be supplied to the commissioner under 
Subsections 31A-5-204(2)(i) and (j), including 
the information required when these subsections 
are applicable by reference under Section 
31A-7-201, Section 31A-8-205, or Subsection 
31A-9-205(2). 
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(b) property in transit over water by means other 
than boat or ship; 
(c) bailee liability; 
(d) fixed transportation property such as 
bridges, electric transmission systems, radio and 
television transmission towers and tunnels; and 
(e) personal and commercial property floaters. 
(39) "Insolvency" means that: 
(a) an insurer is unable to pay its debts or meet 
its obligations as they mature; 
(b) an insurer's total adjusted capital is less than 
the insurer's mandatory control level RBC under 
Subsection 31 A-17-601(7)(c); or 
(c) an insurer is determined to be hazardous 
under this title. 
(40) "Insurance" means any arrangement, 
contract, or plan for the transfer of a risk or risks 
from one or more persons to one or more other 
persons, or any arrangement, contract, or plan for 
the distribution of a risk or risks among a group of 
persons that includes the person seeking to 
distribute his risk. "Insurance" includes: 
(a) risk distributing arrangements providing for 
compensation or replacement for damages or loss 
through the provision of services or benefits in 
kind; 
(b) contracts of guaranty or suretyship entered 
into by the guarantor or surety as a business and 
not as merely incidental to a business transaction; 
and 
(c) plans in which the risk does not rest upon the 
person who makes the arrangements, but with a 
class of persons who have agreed to share it. 
(41) "Insurance adjuster" means a person who 
directs the investigation, negotiation, or settlement 
of a claim under an insurance policy other than 
life insurance or an annuity, on behalf of an 
Copyright (c) West Group 1998 No 
insurer, policyholder, or a claimant under an 
insurance policy. Refer also to Section 
31A-26-102. 
(41.5) "Interinsurance exchange" is defined in 
Subsection (69). 
(42) "Insurance agent" or "agent" means a 
person who represents insurers in soliciting, 
negotiating, or placing insurance. Refer to 
Subsection 31A-23-102 (2) for exceptions to this 
definition. 
(43) "Insurance broker" or "broker" means a 
person who acts in procuring insurance on behalf 
of an applicant for insurance or an insured, and 
does not act on behalf of the insurer except by 
collecting premiums or performing other 
ministerial acts. Refer to Subsection 31A-23-102 
(2) for exceptions to this definition. 
(44) "Insurance business" or "business of 
insurance" includes: 
*8689 (a) providing health care insurance, as 
defined in Subsection (35), by organizations that 
are or should be licensed under this title; 
(b) providing benefits to employees in the event 
of contingencies not within the control of the 
employees, in which the employees are entitled to 
the benefits as a right, which benefits may be 
provided either by single employers or by multiple 
employer groups through trusts, associations, or 
other entities; 
(c) providing annuities, including those issued in 
return for gifts, except those provided by persons 
specified in Subsections 31 A-22-1305(2) and (3); 
(d) providing the characteristic services of motor 
clubs as outlined in Subsection (56); 
(e) providing other persons with insurance as 
defined in Subsection (40); 
(f) making as insurer, guarantor, or surety, or 
proposing to make as insurer, guarantor, or surety, 
any contract or policy of title insurance; 
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UT ST § 31A-1-301, Definitions 
(g) transacting or proposing to transact any 
phase of title insurance, including solicitation, 
negotiation preliminary to execution, execution of 
a contract of title insurance, insuring, and 
transacting matters subsequent to the execution of 
the contract and arising out of it, including 
reinsurance; and 
(h) doing, or proposing to do, any business in 
substance equivalent to Subsections (44)(a) 
through (g) in a manner designed to evade the 
provisions of this title. 
(45) "Insurance consultant" or "consultant" 
means a person who advises other persons about 
insurance needs and coverages, is compensated by 
the person advised on a basis not directly related 
to the insurance placed, and is not compensated 
directly or indirectly by an insurer, agent, or 
broker for advice given. Refer to Subsection 
31A-23-102 (2) for exceptions to this definition. 
(46) "Insurance holding company system" means 
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a group of two or more affiliated persons, at least 
one of whom is an insurer. 
(47) "Insured" means a person to whom or for 
whose benefit an insurer makes a promise in an 
insurance policy. The term includes policyholders, 
subscribers, members, and beneficiaries. This 
definition applies only to the provisions of this 
title and does not define the meaning of this word 
as used in insurance policies or certificates. 
(48) (a) "Insurer" means any person doing an 
insurance business as a principal, including 
fraternal benefit societies, issuers of gift annuities 
other than those specified in Subsections 
31A-22-1305(2) and (3), motor clubs, employee 
welfare plans, and any person purporting or 
intending to do an insurance business as a 
principal on his own account. It does not include a 
governmental entity, as defined in Section 
63-30-2, to the extent it is engaged in the 
activities described in Section 31A-12-107. 
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(51) "License" means the authorization issued 
by the insurance commissioner under this title to 
engage in some activity that is part of or related to 
die insurance business. It includes certificates of 
authority issued to insurers. 
(52) "Life insurance" means insurance on human 
lives and insurances pertaining to or connected 
with human life. The business of life insurance 
includes granting annuity benefits, granting 
endowment benefits, granting additional benefits 
in die event of death by accident or accidental 
means, granting additional benefits in the event of 
the total and permanent disability of the insured, 
and providing optional methods of settlement of 
proceeds. 
(53) "Medical malpractice insurance" means 
insurance against legal liability incident to the 
practice and provision of medical services other 
than the practice and provision of dental services. 
(54) "Member" means a person having 
membership rights in an insurance corporation. 
Refer also to "insured" in Subsection (47). 
(55) "Minimum capital" or "minimum required 
capital" means the capital that must be constantly 
maintained by a stock insurance corporation as 
required by statute. Refer also to "permanent 
surplus" under Subsection (76)(a) and Sections 
31A-5-211,31A-8-209, and 31A-9-209. 
(56) "Motor club" means a person licensed 
under Chapter 5, Domestic Stock and Mutual 
Insurance Corporations, Chapter 11, Motor 
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Clubs, or Chapter 14, Foreign Insurers, that 
promises for an advance consideration to provide 
legal services under Subsection 
31A-ll-102(l)(b), bail services under Subsection 
31A-ll-102(l)(c), trip reimbursement, towing 
services, emergency road services, stolen 
automobile services, a combination of these 
services, or any other services given in 
Subsections 31A-ll-102(l)(b) through (f) for a 
stated period of time. 
(57) "Mutual" means mutual insurance 
corporation. 
(57.5) "Nonparticipating" means a plan of 
insurance under which the insured is not entitled 
to receive dividends representing shares of the 
surplus of the insurer. 
(58) "Ocean marine insurance" means insurance 
against loss of or damage to: 
(a) ships or hulls of ships; 
(b) goods, freight, cargoes, merchandise, effects, 
disbursements, profits, moneys, securities, choses 
in action, evidences of debt, valuable papers, 
bottomry, respondentia interests, or other cargoes 
in or awaiting transit over the oceans or inland 
waterways; 
(c) earnings such as freight, passage money, 
commissions, or profits derived from transporting 
goods or people upon or across the oceans or 
inland waterways; or 
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Utah Code § 31A-6a-101 
WEST fS UTAH CODE 
TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE 
CHAPTER 6A. SERVICE 
CONTRACTS 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in 
this document.) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess. 
§ 31A-6a-101. Definitions 
(1) "Mechanical Breakdown Insurance" means a 
policy, contract, or agreement issued by an 
insurance company that has complied with either 
Title 31 A, Chapter 5, Domestic Stock and Mutual 
Insurance Corporations, or Title 31 A, Chapter 14, 
Foreign Insurers, that undertakes to perform or 
provide repair or replacement service on goods or 
property, or indemnification for repair or 
replacement service, for the operational or 
structural failure of the goods or property due to a 
defect in materials, workmanship, or normal wear 
and tear. 
(2) "Nonmanufacturers' parts" means 
replacement parts not made for or by the original 
manufacturer of the goods commonly referred to 
as "after market parts." 
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(3)(a) "Service contract" means a contract or 
agreement for the repair or maintenance of goods 
or property, for their operational or structural 
failure due to a defect in materials, workmanship, 
or normal wear and tear, with or without 
additional provision for incidental payment of 
indemnity under limited circumstances. 
(b) "Service contract" does not include 
mechanical breakdown insurance as defined in 
Subsection (1). 
(4) "Service contract holder" or "contract 
holder" means a person who purchases a service 
contract. 
(5) "Service contract provider" means a person 
who issues, makes, provides, administers, sells or 
offers to sell a service contract, or who is 
contractually obligated to provide service under a 
service contract. 
(6) "Service contract reimbursement policy" or 
"reimbursement insurance policy" means a policy 
of insurance providing coverage for all obligations 
and liabilities incurred by the service contract 
provider under the terms of the service contract 
issued by the provider. 
As enacted by Chapter 203, Laws of Utah 1992. 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
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Utah Code §31A-6a-102 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE 
CHAPTER 6A. SERVICE 
CONTRACTS 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in 
this document.) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess. 
§ 31A-6a-102. Scope and purposes 
(1) The purposes of this chapter are to: 
(a) create a legal framework within which 
service contracts may be sold in this state; 
(b) encourage innovation in the marketing and 
development of more economical and effective 
ways of providing services under service 
contracts, while placing the risk of innovation on 
the service contract providers rather than on 
consumers; and 
(c) permit and encourage fair and effective 
competition among different systems of providing 
and paying for these services. 
(2) Service contracts may not be issued, sold, or 
offered for sale in this state unless the provider 
has complied with this chapter. Subsections 
31A-l-103(3)(i), (j), and (k) limit the application 
of this chapter to certain persons engaged in a 
limited manner in providing extended warranties 
or service contracts. 
As enacted by Chapter 203, Laws of Utah 1992. 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
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Utah Code § 31 A-6a-103 
W E S T S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE 
CHAPTER 6A. SERVICE 
CONTRACTS 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in 
this document.) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess. 
§ 31A-6a-103. Requirements for doing 
business 
(1) Service contracts may not be issued, sold, or 
offered for sale in this state unless the service 
contract is insured under a service contract 
reimbursement insurance policy issued by an 
insurer authorized to do business in this state, or a 
recognized surplus lines carrier. 
(2)(a) Service contracts may not be issued, sold, 
or offered for sale unless a true and correct copy 
of the service contract and the provider's 
reimbursement insurance policy have been filed 
with the commissioner. Copies of contracts and 
policies must be filed no less than 30 days prior to 
the issuance, sale offering for sale, or use of the 
service contract or reimbursement insurance 
policy in this state. 
(b) Each modification of the terms of any 
service contract or reimbursement insurance 
policy must also be filed 30 days prior to its use in 
this state. Each filing must be accompanied by a 
filing fee as required under Subsection 
31A-3-103, or the filing shall be rejected. 
(c) Persons complying with this chapter are not 
required to comply with Subsections 
31A-21-201(1) and 31A-23-302 (3), or Chapter 
19, Rate Regulation. 
(3)(a) Premiums collected on service contracts 
are not subject to premium taxes. 
(b) Premiums collected by issuers of 
reimbursement insurance policies are subject to 
premium taxes. 
(4) Persons marketing, selling, or offering to sell 
service contracts for service contract providers 
that comply with this chapter are exempt from the 
licensing requirements of this title. 
(5) Service contract providers complying with 
this chapter are not required to compl} with 
Chapter 5, Domestic Stock and Mutual Insurance 
Corporations, Chapter 7, Nonprofit Health 
Service Insurance Corporations, Chapter 8, Health 
Maintenance Organizations and Limited Health 
Plans, Chapter 9, Insurance Fraternals, Chapter 
10, Annuities, Chapter 11, Motor Clubs, Chapter 
12, State Risk Management Fund, Chapter 13, 
Employee Welfare Funds and Plans, Chapter 14, 
Foreign Insurers, Chapter 19, Rate Regulation, 
Chapter 25, Third Party Administrators, and 
Chapter 28, Guaranty Associations. 
*8893 
As enacted by Chapter 203, Laws of Utah J 992. 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
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Utah Code §31A-6a-104 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE 
CHAPTER 6A. SERVICE 
CONTRACTS 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in 
this document.) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess. 
§ 31A-6a-104. Required disclosures 
(1) All service contract reimbursement insurance 
policies insuring service contracts issued, sold, or 
offered for sale in this state must conspicuously 
state that, upon failure of the provider to perform 
under the contract, the issuer of the policy shall 
pay on behalf of the provider any sums the 
provider is legally obligated to pay or shall 
provide the service which the provider is legally 
obligated to perform, according to the provider's 
contractual obligations under the service contracts 
issued or sold by the provider. 
(2) A service contract may not be issued, sold, 
or offered for sale in this state unless the contract 
contains a statement in substantially the following 
form, "Obligations of the provider under this 
service contract are guaranteed under a service 
contract reimbursement insurance policy. Should 
the provider fail to pay or provide service on any 
claim within 60 days after proof of loss has been 
filed, the contract holder is entitled to make a 
claim directly against the Insurance Company." 
The contract shall also conspicuously state the 
name and address and a toll free claims service 
telephone number of the insurer. 
(3) The contract must identify the provider, the 
seller, and the service contract holder. 
(4) The contract must conspicuously state the 
total purchase price and the terms under which it 
Copyright (c) West Group 1998 No 
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is to be paid. 
(5) If prior approval of repair work is required, 
the contract must conspicuously state the 
procedure for obtaining prior approval and for 
making a claim, including a toll free telephone 
number for claim service and a procedure for 
obtaining reimbursement for emergency repairs 
performed outside of normal business hours 
(6) The contract must conspicuously state the 
existence of any deductible amount. 
(7) The contract must specify the merchandise, 
services to be provided and any limitations, 
exceptions, or exclusions. Any preexisting 
conditions clause must specifically state which 
preexisting conditions are excluded from 
coverage. 
(8) The contract must state the conditions upon 
which the use of nonmanufacturers1 parts will be 
allowed. Conditions stated must comply with 
applicable state and federal laws. 
*8895 (9) The contract must state any terms, 
restrictions, or conditions governing the 
transferability of the service contract. 
(10) The contract must state the terms, 
restrictions, or conditions governing cancellation 
of the contract by either the contract holder or 
provider, and must satisfy the provisions of 
Sections 31A-21-303 through 31A-21-305. 
(11) A service contract or reimbursement 
insurance policy may not be issued, sold, or 
offered for sale in this state unless the contract 
contains a statement in substantially the following 
form, "Coverage afforded under this contract is 
not guaranteed by the Property and Casualty 
Guaranty Association." 
As enacted by Chapter 203, Laws of Utah 1992. 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
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Utah Code § 31A-6a-105 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE 
CHAPTER 6A. SERVICE 
CONTRACTS 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in 
this document.) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess. 
§ 31A-6a-105. Prohibited acts 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection 
31A-6a-104(2), a service contract provider may 
not use in its name, contracts, or literature: 
(a) any of the words insurance, casualty, surety, 
mutual, or any other words descriptive of the 
Page 1 
insurance, casualty, or surety business; or 
(b) a name deceptively similar to the name or 
description of any insurance or surety corporation, 
or any other service contract provider. 
(2) A service contract provider or his 
representative may not make, permit, or cause to 
be made any false or misleading statement, or 
deliberately omit any material statement that 
would be considered misleading if omitted, in 
connection with the sale, offer to sell, or 
advertisement of a service contract. 
(3) A bank, savings and loan association, 
insurance company, or other lending institution 
may not require the purchase of a service contract 
as a condition of a loan. 
As enacted by Chapter 203, Laws of Utah 1992. 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
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Utah Code § 31A-6a-106 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE 
CHAPTER 6A. SERVICE 
CONTRACTS 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in 
this document) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess 
§ 31A-6a-106. Recordkeeping 
requirements 
(l)(a) All service contract providers shall keep 
accurate accounts, books, and records concerning 
transactions regulated under this chapter 
(b) A service contract provider's accounts, 
books, and records shall include 
(1) copies of all service contracts issued, 
(u) the name and address of each service 
contract holder, and 
(in) claims files 
(c) Service contract providers shall retain all 
records pertaining to each service contract nolder 
for at least three years after the specified pei lod of 
coverage has expired 
(2) A provider discontinuing bus mess in dns 
state shall mamtam its records until it furnishes 
the commissioner satisfactory proof that it has 
discharged all obligations to contract holders in 
this state 
(3) Service contract providers shall make all 
accounts, books, and records concerning 
transactions regulated under this chapter oi other 
pertinent chapters available to the commissioner 
for the purpose of examination as provided in 
Sections 31A-2-203 and 31A-2-204 
As enacted by Chapter 203, Laws of Utah 1992 
Search this disc for cases citmg this section 
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Utah Code § 31A-6a-107 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE 
CHAPTER 6A. SERVICE 
CONTRACTS 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in 
this document.) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess. 
§ 31A-6a-107. Cancellation of 
reimbursement insurance 
irsement insurance Page 1 
The issuer of a reimbursement insurance policy 
may not cancel the policy until a notice of 
cancellation in accordance with Section 
31A-21-303, 31A-21-304, or 31A-21-305 has 
been mailed or delivered to the commissioner and 
to each insured provider. The cancellation of a 
reimbursement policy may not reduce the issuer's 
responsibility for service contracts issued by 
providers prior to the date of the cancellation. 
Added by Laws 1992, c. 203. Amended by Laws l997, c. 
10, § 37, eff. May 5, 1997. 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
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Utah Code § 31 A-6a-108 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE 
CHAPTER 6A. SERVICE 
CONTRACTS 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in 
this document.) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess 
§ 31A-6a-108. Obligation or 
reimbursement insurance issuers 
Providers under this chapter are considered to be 
the agent of the issuer of die reimbursement 
insurance for purposes of Section 31A-23-311 In 
cases where a provider is acting as an 
administrator and enlists other provider^ , the 
provider actmg as the administrator shall notify 
die issuer of the reimbursement insurance of die 
other providers 
As enacted by Chapter 203 Laws of Utah 1992 
Search dus disc for cases citmg dus section 
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Utah Code § 31 A-6a-109 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE 
CHAPTER 6A. SERVICE 
CONTRACTS 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc* is provided subsequently in 
this document) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess. 
§ 31A-6a-109. Enforcement provisions 
Anyone violating any of the provisions of this 
chapter or any rule made pursuant to the grant of 
rulemaking authority under this title may be 
assessed an administrative forfeiture equal to two 
times the amount of any profit gained from the 
violation. In addition an administrative forfeiture 
may be assessed for each violation not to exceed 
$1,000 per violation. If the violations are 
continuing, or are of a serious nature, or a person's 
business practices in connection with the 
solicitation, sale, offering for sale, or performance 
under a service contract subject to this chapter, 
constitute a danger to the legitimate interests of 
consumers or the public, the commissioner may 
enjoin the person from soliciting, selling, or 
offering to sell service contracts in this state either 
permanently or for a stated period of time. 
As enacted by Chapter 203, Laws of Utah 1992. 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
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UtahCode§31A-6a-110 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE 
CHAPTER 6A. SERVICE 
CONTRACTS 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in 
this document.) 
Current through End of 1998 General Sess 
§ 31A-6a-110. Rulemaking 
(1) Pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act, the 
commissioner may make rules necessary to assist 
Page 1 
m the enforcement of this chapter 
(2) The commissioner may by rule or order, after 
a hearmg, exempt certam service contract 
providers or service contract providers for a 
specific class of service contracts that are not 
otherwise exempt under Subsections 31A-1-103 
(3)(0, OX or (k), from any provision of this title 
The commissioner may order substitute 
requirements on a finding that a particular 
provision of this title is not necessary for the 
protection of the public or that the substitute 
requirement is reasonably certam to provide 
equivalent protection to the public 
As enacted by Chapter 203 Laws of Utah 1992 
Search this disc for cases citing tins section 
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RCP Rule 15, RULE 15. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS Pagel 
*35 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15 
WESTS UTAH COURT RULES 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 
PART ffl. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, 
AND ORDERS 
Current with amendments received through 
11-1-98 
RULE 15. AMENDED AND 
SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his 
pleading once as a matter of course at any time 
before a responsive pleading is served or, if the 
pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is 
permitted and the action has not been placed upon 
the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time 
within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a 
party may amend his pleading only by leave of 
court or by written consent of the adverse party; 
and leave shall be freely given when justice so 
requires. A party shall plead in response to an 
amended pleading within the time remaining for 
response to the original pleading or within 10 
days after service of the amended pleading, 
whichever period may be the longer, unless the 
court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. 
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried 
by express or implied consent of the parties, they 
shall be treated in all respects as if they had been 
raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the 
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to 
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues 
may be made upon motion of any party at any 
time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend 
does not affect the result of the trial of these 
issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the 
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be 
amended when the presentation of the merits of 
the action will be subserved thereby and the 
objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the 
admission of such evidence would prejudice him 
in maintaining his action or defense upon the 
merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if 
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet 
such evidence. 
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever 
the claim or defense asserted in the amended 
pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or 
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in 
the original pleading, the amendment relates back 
to the date of the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental Pleadings. Upon motion of a 
party the court may, upon reasonable notice and 
upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a 
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions 
or occurrences or events which have happened 
since the date of the pleading sought to be 
supplemented. Permission may be granted even 
though the original pleading is defective in its 
statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the 
court deems it advisable that the adverse party 
plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall so 
order, specifying the time therefor. 
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Kendall S. Peterson (4389) 
Darwin H. Bingham (7810) 
PETERSON REED L.L.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
321 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-4040 
Fax: (801) 364-4060 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID PUGH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NORTH AMERICAN WARRANTY 
SERVICES, INC., 
Defendant, 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 970006006 CV 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMENTS 
This matter came on for trial before the Honorable Robert K. Hilder on June 25, 
1998. Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel Kendall S. Peterson. Defendant was 
represented by counsel Robert W. Hughes. The Court, having considered the Statement of 
Stipulated Facts entered into between the parties including the exhibits contained therein, having 
^omsnurcoeiiT 
rhird Judicial )Uiict 
$ 
£p. AUG 2=:::3 
e-v^itty Clerk 
heard the testimony of witnesses called at trial and the oral argument of counsel and having 
previously entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, hereby enters the following: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff David 
Pugh is granted judgment against North American Warranty Services Inc. for the following 
items: 
Towing 
Emergency travel 
Remaining repair expense 
Loss of use of vehicle 
Attorneys fees 
Court costs 
Minus (Deductible) 
$ 50.00 
135.00 
225.00 
6,750.00 
6,426.00 
106.50 
- 50.00 
$13,642.50 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this judgment 
shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in collecting 
said judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be established by affidavit. 
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